Unek-unek

This paper aims at discussing CO₂
emissions as the result of market failure and some alternatives to deal with
it. In details, I firstly demonstrate why climate change is caused by market
failure through greenhouse gasses emissions (GHG) and CO₂ emissions.
Secondly I outline and briefly mention several policy instruments available to
deal with such problems. Thirdly and lastly, I discussed each instrument’s
advantages and disadvantages.

The market usually does not function
very well when it comes to public good as the public good has no price in it. Price
can be assigned when there is property rights attached to the goods. That is
exactly what is happening with public good, it lacks of property rights or is
having ill-defined property rights. Imposing property rights means that we give
the right to utilize the goods to some one/entities/clubs. Meanwhile, the characteristics of public good
are non-excludability and non-rivalry. Non excludability means that it is
impossible to exclude some one from utilizing the good. Non-rivalry means that the
consumption of the good by an individual does not reduce the available amount
for others to consume.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) and
other GHG are emitted to the earth atmosphere. Meanwhile, the atmosphere itself
is a public good. It is non-excludable as everyone in the earth can emit
anything to it or breathe the air from the atmosphere. It is non-rivalry since
my emission does not reduce others’ rights to emit. It does not have price and
thus no available market mechanism. In the end, when everyone emits GHG and CO₂
to the atmosphere, then there will be excessive stock pollutions in the
atmosphere. Moreover, it is subsequently causing climate change.

However, as the awareness of the
danger of climate change arise, countries started to seek out solutions to this
problem. The climate change is a complex problem since it is a transboundary
problem –i.e. climate change happens in everywhere and is caused in every place-
and the existence of spill over –i.e the abatement of one country is enjoyed by
other countries, so does the pollution of one country is affecting other
countries too-.

There are several policy instruments
available that can be used to mitigate the climate change problem. The policy
instruments are grouped into three categories that are institutional approaches
such as voluntary bargaining, command and control such as emission regulation,
and economic incentive instruments such as taxes, subsidies, and tradable
emission permits. The underline idea in economic incentive instrument is to
give price to the emission so that profit-maximizing firm will also taking into
account the opportunity cost of emission into their production plan.[1]

A profit-maximizing firm produces
goods at optimal output level of maximal profit. Profit is maximal when
marginal costs of firm equals to marginal benefits of firm (MC = MB). However
when firm pollutes and the pollution is not priced, it creates social costs/damages
to the society. The damages are called externality and are often not calculated
in product price. By giving price to the damages –either through subsidies,
taxes, or emission trades- the pollution then influences the cost function of
the firm. Thus the firm internalizes the externalities.

Environmental taxes or known as
Pigouvian Taxes is a practice of assigning taxes to pollution emitted by firms.
Taxes are assigned to pollution as it will be less efficient if assigned to
inputs or final products.[2]
Pollutions are to some extent allowed as in an economic point of view, it is
never about achieving zero pollution, and instead it is about balancing the
benefits and costs. There are three steps to find the balance between benefits
and costs –i.e. the optimal pollution level- that is identifying firm/industry
profit function, the social damages function –that is the externality effects-,
and the optimal pollution level.

The optimal pollution level is the
point where the shadow price of social benefit is equal to the shadow price of cost.
The shadow price of social benefit is the reduction in social damages due to a
reduction in product produced, while the shadow price of cost is the loss of
firm profits due to a reduction of a unit produced. In order to find the shadow
price, we should calculate the marginal function –i.e. the first derivative- of
firm’s profit function and social damages function. The next step is to
equalize the marginal social benefit and marginal abatement costs.
Environmental taxes then are applied to this level.

Subsidies work similarly to
environmental taxes as at the optimal pollution level both mechanism –the
environmental taxes and subsidies- are levied or paid at the same rate.[3]
However, as Perman (2003) noted “the two
instruments are different in their effects on income distribution”. Taxes
caused firms to lose income while subsidies caused firms to gain income. In the
short-run and at the optimal pollution level both mechanisms are similar;
nevertheless, as subsidies are given in form of lump-sum payment, subsidies may
give different long-term effects.[4]

Another mechanism of economic
incentive mechanism is marketable emission permit. The idea is that government
set an overall industry emission level and let the firms distribute the
emission level independent of government intervention. In general, the
mechanism works as follow: first, the government set a targeted industry
emission level; second, an initial emission permit is distributed to each firm;
third, firms sell/buy permit to another firms. This mechanism is also known as
the cap-and-trade mechanism. Firms are able to sell or buy permit as they are
different in their profit function. A firm may find it more profitable to emit
more while other firms may find it more profitable to emit less and sell the
excess allowances. Thus, an increase in one firm is compensated by decrease in
other firm/s. Tradability is an important characteristic of marketable emission
permit that grouped it into economic incentive instruments, otherwise it will
be categorized as a command and control instruments.

There are several indicators to
compare between above mentioned mechanism that is cost-efficiency and
monitoring-administering-and-enforcing-compliance costs, long run effects,
double dividend, and equity/distribution. It is obvious that command and
control instruments are least cost-efficient compare to economic incentive instruments
as compliance costs are usually high. European union emission trading for
example estimates that the cost of emission trading is between 2.9 billion
euros and 3.7 billion euros compare to 6.8 billion euros compliance costs
annually.[5]
Among economic incentive instruments, emission trading is the most
cost-efficient compare to other instruments.[6]
However, command and control may create greater long-run effects in term of
technology advancement compare to other instruments as it provides incentive
and guidance for technology research. I think that emission trading will give
the biggest “double dividend” as it creates a lot of job opportunity. As of
distribution issue, taxes may cause bigger effect for consumer –i.e. consumers
bear the cost- regardless of polluter pays principle especially when market is
of monopoly or oligopoly market.

Furthermore, in the presence of
corruption, I think the emission trading will give best results compare to
other instruments. The reason is that emission trading will minimize the
involvement of civil servant in its operation and thus minimize the possibility
of corruption.

Based on above comparisons, I think
the best instrument is the emission trading.

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 REFERENCES

European Commision. (2005) EU Action
Against Climate Change: EU Emission Trading - an Open Scheme Promoting Global
Innovation, Belgium.

Perman, R., Common, M., Mcqilvray, J., Ma, Yue. (2003) Natural Resources and Environmental Economics, 3^rd
edition.